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# Moscow Views Shultz Trip As Crucial

## *Missile Pact With Reagan May Hang on Kremlin Talks*

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MOSCOW, April 11—A senior Soviet official said today that Secretary of State George P. Shultz's visit here next week will determine for Moscow whether an arms control agreement is still possible in the remaining months of the Reagan administration.

The official, who is actively involved in preparing for the three days of talks that begin Monday, said Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's latest proposal to hold separate negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles was intended to remove the last major obstacle to an early agreement on the removal of medium-range weapons from Europe.

"The Shultz visit will be crucial in ascertaining whether this administration wants to have agreements with us," said the official, who asked not to be quoted by name. Calling an intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) accord "our priority now," the official indicated that Moscow is prepared to strike a bargain on such a pact, despite increasingly strident exchanges over embassy espionage charges in both capitals.

Given the importance of the Shultz visit, Soviet officials and other observers say they are particularly upset by the rhetorical cross fire over bugging efforts in rival embassies. They believe the charges of intrusion by Soviet agents into the U.S. Embassy here have been exploited by hard-liners in Washington seeking to thwart prospects for real progress in arms control and other important matters at a crucial juncture in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Georgi Arbatov, director of Moscow's Institute of U.S.A. and Canada and a leading expert on U.S. affairs, said, "It has become a routine operation for your people [Americans] to have the kettle of emotions on the fire, to raise these problems, whenever something looked as though it is improving between us."

Among the incidents mentioned by Arbatov or other Soviet officials were:

- The U.S. discovery of a "Soviet combat brigade" in Cuba in August 1979, as the U.S. Senate was preparing to take up ratification of the SALT II strategic arms treaty. It turned out after weeks of tense top-level diplomacy that the brigade had been in Cuba since 1962 and was long known to the United States.

- U.S. charges of "murder" lodged against the Soviet Union in the shooting down of a South Korean airliner on Aug. 31, 1983, as some officials in the Reagan ad-

ministration were moving toward a step-by-step improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. "It has become absolutely clear," said Arbatov, "that your people, while raising such a moralistic outcry, knew for sure that we thought it [the airliner] was a U.S. military airplane."

- Official charges in July and August 1985, during early preparations for the Geneva summit, that a possibly cancer-causing "spy dust" was being used by Soviet intelligence to keep track of U.S. Embassy personnel. It turned out, months later, that the "tracking powder" had been used at times for decades and that there was no evidence that it causes cancer.

- The arrest and incarceration of Gennadi Zakharov, a Soviet employee of the United Nations, on spying charges last August as the two leaderships were exchanging arms control proposals that led to the Reykjavik summit. Zakharov's arrest triggered the Soviet retaliatory arrest a week later of American journalist Nicholas Daniloff, which in turn dominated previously scheduled meetings between Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

"I can't believe your people in arresting Zakharov did not take into account there would be an answer from the Soviet side, especially when contrary to established practice, they did not put him into the custody of the Soviet ambassador" rather than keeping him in jail, Arbatov said.

In the current case, it has been noted here that Sgt. Clayton Lonetree, allegedly the key U.S. Marine guard in the embassy espionage affair, left Moscow in March 1986 and Cpl. Arnold Bracy, his alleged accomplice, left Moscow last September. Lonetree's confession dates to last December and American public knowledge to a Los Angeles Times story Jan. 10.

The accusations were made public months ago, Arbatov said, "but after Gorbachev's [Feb. 28] proposal [on missiles in Europe] and the news that Shultz was coming, suddenly everything flared up with tremendous details that have never been proven.

"It is absolutely obvious that there are rather influential people, groups, maybe institutions, that are against any normalization of rela-

tions between the United States and the Soviet Union" and find ways to cause trouble at important times, Arbatov charged.

A Soviet Foreign Ministry official, taking a different tack, said he wondered if the State Department has "a rule in its books" that it should always create "a tense atmosphere" to improve the U.S. bargaining position at key meetings.

The official said he would be very concerned if the highly publicized issue of Moscow embassy security, which he said had been little discussed in official channels, should turn out to be "a signal" that Washington is not serious about arms control bargaining.

Besides the distracting flap over espionage at the embassy, Soviet officials remain unimpressed by recent shifts in the U.S. bargaining positions on strategic weapons and space-based defenses, the other two areas of arms control, besides medium-range missiles in Europe, being discussed at the Geneva negotiations.

A decision by President Reagan to cut back his guaranteed adherence to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty limits that would restrain development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—from a 10-year period, beginning in 1986, to a five-year period, beginning whenever a new treaty takes effect—would be "a tremendous step back" from the U.S. position at the Reykjavik summit and in follow-up discussions in Vienna and Geneva, according to the senior Soviet official.

Such a shift in position was described as "absolutely unacceptable" to the Soviet Union and thus would pose a significant new impediment to a U.S.-Soviet accord on a drastic reduction in strategic arms, which is tied to a space arms agreement.

[U.S. officials in Washington Saturday clarified earlier statements about the new administration position, saying that Shultz was specifically authorized to tell the Soviet leaders that the United States is willing to abide by the "broad" or permissive interpretation of the ABM treaty through 1994, Washington Post staff writer R. Jeffrey Smith reported.

[Because negotiations and ratification would take nearly two years, no strategic arms treaty is